In the secure communication problem, we focus on safe termination. In applications such as electronic transactions, we want each party to be ensured that both sides agree on the same state: success or failure. This problem is equivalent to the well known coordinated attack problem. Solutions exist. They however concentrate on the probability of disagreement, and attack incentives have been overlooked so far. Furthermore, they focus on a notion of round and are not optimal in terms of communication complexity.
Synchronization Protocol
For applications requiring secure communication, we often use standard cryptography to achieve security at the packet level in terms of authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. Assuming cryptography performs a good job, adversaries can still try to remove, replay, or permute packets. Standard solutions consist in authenticating a sequence number for each packet so that the packet sequentiality can no longer be corrupted. One remaining problem though: the adversary can still maliciously remove final packets by disconnecting the channel, depending on what she has seen so far (namely, the volume and directions of packets). To solve this, both parties must agree that the communication is over by means of a synchronization protocol.
In contract signing protocols, after participant Alice sent the signed contract to Bob, Bob signed it and sent it back to Alice, Bob may assume that the contract is signed and will be executed but Alice may have never received the signature and may be assuming that Bob declined the contract. Informally, contract signing should be followed by a synchronization protocol: each party decides whether the protocol is assumed to have succeeded and launch a synchronization protocol with this input bit. At the end of the protocol, their output tells whether it is indeed agreed on a success or not. Note that there is a tricky distinction between P a and P c which will be shown in the sequel. P a gives confidence to A and B that the protocol will succeed while P c measures the incentive for misbehavior.
Related work. In 1978, Gray [5] introduced the Generals paradox, later called coordinated attack problem. In this problem, two or several participants must agree on a binary decision (attack or not) through a communication channel that can maliciously remove messages. Even and Jacobi [3] have shown that it cannot be solved with 100% probability with finite complexity so we must consider a probability of disagreement. As detailed below, optimal solutions have been proposed (first in 1992) in the multiparty case by Lynch and Varghese [6, 8] . Problems that are related to coordinated attack include consensus [4] , non-blocking atomic commitment [2, 7] , and fair exchange. KiT-based solution consists of making the exchange at the guardian angels level, then making a synchronization to check whether the exchange was fair, and finally releasing the obtained digital information.
Varghese-Lynch protocol. In the protocol by Varghese and Lynch [6, 8] , the participants run a given (public) number of rounds r in any case (namely, even when they stop receiving messages by others). Rounds are scheduled periods of time during which the participants must exchange a message in all directions. The protocol is optimal in terms of number of rounds. (For two participants, the message complexity is indeed C = 2r and the running time is r "units" where a unit upper bounds the required time to exchange two messages. So, some time is wasted if transmission is faster than a unit.) At the beginning, the originator of the protocol picks a random number N ∈ {1, . . . , r} with uniform distribution and sends it to his counterpart. Each party manages a counter initialized to 0, whose value is sent in each message.
At the end of a round, the internal counter is synchronized with the received one (if any). At the beginning of a round, it is incremented by 1. The secret number N picked by the originator is a threshold used at the end of the exchanges: each party outputs 1 if and only if its counter is at least equal to N . So, the only way for the adversary to injure the parties is to guess the value N , and then to cut any messages, provided that one counter is equal to N while the other is smaller. Analysis shows that P a = P c = 1 r ( [6, 8] only consider P a but we can easily show that P c is the same in the case of this protocol).
Our contribution. In this paper, we focus on average communication complexity in terms of number of exchanged messages. We distinguish the measures P a and P c (while previous work concentrated on P a ). Then, we formalize a variant of the Keep-In-Touch protocol (KiT). We show that it is a synchronization protocol. Finally, we prove optimality in terms of number of exchanged messages. It is notably more efficient than the Lynch-Varghese protocol with two participants since the running time no longer depends on synchronized rounds and that we achieve
We propose a variant of the KiT protocol (that we call KiT protocol as well in the sequel) as depicted on Fig. 1 . The principle is quite simple: if the input of A is 1 then A picks a random number N ≥ 0 and sends it to B (note that the confidentiality of N is protected). N represents the number of messages that should be exchanged after B joined the protocol by sending his first message. Depending on the probability distribution for N , it can be bounded or not. Then, if both inputs are 1, A and B just keep in touch by sequentially exchanging authenticated messages. Contrarily to the first message which includes N , the N + 1 other messages are really empty ones! In case of time-out while expecting a message, a participant stops and yields 0. Termination side channel protection. In the case where the adversary has access to the output of A or B through a side channel, the last sender should wait for a given period larger than the time-out before terminating. This makes sure that both A and B complete before the adversary gets any side information. The last receiver might still acknowledge for the last message to prevent the other party from waiting, but disconnection at this point should not change the output. The consequence of such an attack is only a time loss for the waiting participant.
Time-out removal. Similarly, when a = 0, A can prevent B from waiting by sending a specific message. The a = 1 and b = 0 case is similar. 
and a probability of asymmetric termination of P a = 1 n . The worst case complexity is C = n + 1. However we have P c = 1 (with i = n − 1). In other words, the longer the adversary waits before performing his attack, the greater the probability the attack succeeds, in particular if his strategy is to disconnect at m n−1 then his attack definitely succeeds. Optimal distributions for the KiT protocol. The distribution choice plays on the message complexity and the parameters P a and P c . Obviously there is a trade-off. The optimal case is studied in the following theorem. p 0 , p 1 , . . . denote the probability distribution of N in the KiT protocol. We have E(N ) ≥ 1 2
Example 2 For any p, when p
i = (1 − p) i p for i ≥ 0 we have E(N ) = 1 p − 1 thus E(C) ≤
Theorem 2 Let
where P a and P c are the probability of asymmetric termination and the probability that the crime pays off respectively. This shows that Example 1 is the optimal case for P a and that Example 2 is the optimal case for P c .
Proof 2 We want to minimize E(N ) for a given P a . Due to Theorem 1, it is equivalent to finding
p 0 , p 1 , . . . such that 0 ≤ p i ≤ P a for all i, p i = 1, and ip i minimal. Let n = 1 P a and α = 1 P a − n. We have α ∈ [0, 1[.
Obviously ip i is minimal when the first p i s are maximal, i.e., when p
The sum of all remaining p i is equal to 1 − nP a . Thus we have
This proves the first bound.
For the second bound we notice that
Since we have j≥i p j ≥
for all i due to Theorem 1, we obtain that E(N ) ≥
Bit-messages variant. Instead of picking N once and sending it at the beginning of the protocol, we can just ask each participant to toss a coin before sending m i and sending the result of the toss in the message. "Head" means "let's keep in touch" and "tail" means "so long". Obviously, if the coin is biased such that the ith toss is "tail" with probability Pr[N = i|N ≥ i], this variant is fully equivalent to the above protocol. Example 2 is equivalent to the case where the probability to get "tail" is p for all i.
Optimality of the KiT Protocol
We prove in this section that our protocol is optimal within our settings. This also (re)proves that perfect synchronization cannot be ensured with P a = 0 or P c = 0 with a finite message complexity (since KiT protocols do not). 
